Nostalgia for Greater Serbia: Media coverage of Radovan Karadžic’s arrest by Volcic, Zala & Erjavec, Karmen
Zala Volcic is a postdoctoral fellow in the Centre for Critical and Cultural Studies at the University
of Queensland in Australia (z.volcic@uq.edu.au). Karmen Erjavec is a professor in the Faculty of
Social Studies at the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia (karmen.erjavec@fdv.uni-lj.si).. 
24 Journal of Global Mass Communication, Vol. II, Nos. 1/2 (Winter/Spring 2009)
NOSTALGIA FOR GREATER SERBIA:
MEDIA COVERAGE OF
RADOVAN KARADŽIÆ’S ARREST
ZALA VOLCIC AND KARMEN ERJAVEC 2
The arrest of former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžiæ in July 2008 triggered
wide-spread international interest and provided the opportunity for the Serbian
public and its media to reflect upon the role of Serbia in the Yugoslav wars of the
1990s. Karadžiæ was a Bosnian-Serb president of the self-proclaimed Serbian
republic within Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was indicted for genocide and crimes
against humanity in 1995. On the basis of critical discourse analysis, we argue that
Television Serbia, while covering Karadžiæ's arrest, constructed a nationalistic
discourse by invoking nostalgia for Greater Serbia in ways that suppressed or
concealed any connection between Karadžiæ specifically, the Serbs in general, and
especially the current government with war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At
the same time this discourse celebrated Serbia as a superior nation as it progressed
toward inclusion in the European Union. 
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war criminal 
His world turned upside down
And through his memory like a honeycomb
A bullet,
A slender bullet, majestic bullet.
Radovan Karadžiæ, a Bosnian-Serb politician and a poet, accused of genocide and
crimes against humanity for his role in ethnic cleansing during the Bosnian war in the
1990s, in a poem A Morning Hand Grenade (1983)
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In the Serbian context, poets have traditionally played a crucial role in invoking
nationalistic sentiment, and in this respect the political ascendance of the nationalist poet
and a politician Radovan Karadžiæ was not as exceptional as it might have been in other
national contexts. Serbian leaders have long had poetic ambitions, and poets have played an
important role in the national political imaginary. Serbian folk poems, while using myths
of origin and ancestry, in particular supported the struggle for the preservation of the
Serbian national character in various historical periods, including the 1990s (Zarkovic,
2008).  In the Balkan region more generally, poets are recognized as playing a crucial role1
in imagining their nations by fostering myths, memories and nostalgia for some golden past,
in which heroic events (victories/glories and sacrifices/traumas) and heroes (actual historical
figures and/or mythologized characters) occupy a prominent position (Colovic, 2002).
Furthermore, poets are often understood as able to emotionally inspire the members of the
group to foster a sense of belonging and cohesion. Specifically, many scholars also point to
the nostalgic sentiments expressed in Serbian nationalistic poetry – these offer simplistic
ideals in order to avoid confronting the realities of daily life. Nostalgic sentiments can, as
Boym argues, express both love of the past and hate of the Other (Boym, 2001). 
During the wars of the1990s in the former Yugoslavia, poets from all of the former
Yugoslav states provided much of the raw material for the exclusionary national
imagination, invoking a revered and idealized past in ways that foment nationalist conflict.
Poets were intensely involved in the ideological labour that brought together selective
cultural elements, historical memories, and interpretations of experiences (Colovic, 2002).
The role of poets in the conflict has led Slavoj Zizek, a Slovene philosopher, to famously
declare that “instead of the military-industrial complex, we in post-Yugoslavia had the
military-poetic complex personified in the twin figures of Ratko Mladiæ and Radovan
Karadžiæ” (Zizek, 2008: 17). This article explores the ways in which Serbian TV covered
Karadžiæ's arrest, arguing that it complemented the aestheticization of politics enacted by
his poetry. In this regard, we might supplement Zizek's account by noting the way in which
the forms of forgetting, idealization, and nostalgia that characterized nationalist poetry were
reproduced for mass audiences by the electronic media, creating a military-poetic-media-
entertainment complex. 
Karadžiæ, a former Bosnian Serb leader accused of genocide and crimes against
humanity for his role in the ethnic cleansing that took place during the Bosnian war in the
1990s, was notorious for inciting Serbian troops with his speeches and poems full of
nostalgic sentiments for Greater Serbia.  In his own poetry, the butchery he had led against2
“the Turks”– Bosnian Muslims – was openly expressed.  As Colovic (2002) points out,3
“exile, destruction, death, and return to a forsaken homeland” as well as “hatred” are themes
that commonly feature in his works and actions. The titles of his poems are illustrative here:
Goodbye, Assassins, A Man Made of Ashes, and War Boots. Colovic (2002: 34) calls
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Karadžiæ’s poetry “war-propaganda folklore” that transfers “conflicts from the sphere of
politics, economy and history into the extrapolated sphere of myth.” 
In 1996, after the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH), Karadžiæ went into
hiding for thirteen years. He was captured as Dragan Dabiæ on July 21, 2008, in Belgrade,
Serbia, where he had been cultivating a long white beard, practising alternative medicine,
was a regular health magazine contributor and even gave public lectures. To the Serbian
radical party, he is “the greatest Serbian hero,” whereas an architect of the Dayton Accords
Richard Holbrooke calls him “a European Osama bin Laden.”  4
On July 22, 2008, a day after his arrest, the television program entitled “Television
Serbia on Radovan Karadžiæ” was broadcast on Television Serbia (TS) and achieved the
highest ratings of any television program in Serbia (Gledanost RTS, 2008). It also fostered
active public debate. For example, the Serbian Radical party accused TS of “dangerous anti-
Serbian journalism,” while, on the other hand, different non-governmental organizations for
human rights claimed the show represented yet another example of the “banalization of
crimes” (Torov, 2008). The arrest itself deeply polarized the Serbian public: less than half
of the citizens (42%) supported the arrest and extradition of Karadžiæ to the Hague, while
54% opposed it; roughly a third of the Serbian population defined Karadžiæ as a Serbian
national hero, and 40% saw him as neither a national hero nor a war criminal (Pola-pola oko
izrucenja, 2008). 
The first part of this paper introduces some historical frameworks and theoretical
investigations. We briefly deal with Boym’s “reflective” and “restorative” definitions of
nostalgia – she distinguishes between two narratives of nostalgia that frame feelings of
dislocation differently, since they both try to understand how we relate to a collective home
(41). In the second part, we present a study which uncovers how TS exploits and further
incorporates a particular social event (in our case, Karadžiæ’s arrest) into nationalistic and
a “restorative nostalgic” discourse. The research is based on critical discourse analysis
(Fairclough, 1992; Van Leeuwen, 1996; Wodak, 1996, 2006). We argue that TS, while
covering Karadžiæ’s arrest, constructed a nationalistic discourse that invoked nostalgia for
the prospect of the creation of Greater Serbia. Any connections between Karadžiæ, the Serbs,
and especially the current government with war crimes in BH were brushed aside. This
nostalgia for Greater Serbia, we argue, exemplifies a political paradox in Serbia: at the same
time that information on the historical atrocities of the former Yugoslav regimes and of
Serbia’s role in these atrocities was being made available to the Serbian public, nostalgia
for selected cultural aspects of the Serbian past is growing as well. The conclusions offer
some observations directed towards answering how to refine theories of memory, nostalgia,
and media culture in ways that might help to challenge the manipulation of popular
discourses by those who seek to exacerbate the forms of nationalism, racism, and historical
hatred that have divided the region.
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THE POLITICAL-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Science and Art prepared a Memorandum – a long list
of Serbian grievances against their position within the Yugoslav federation – which
articulated the need for a collective mobilization of the Serbs throughout Yugoslavia.
Slobodan Miloseviæ, a Serbian president from 1990-2000, reproduced historical and
scientific data for the construction of the ideology of Greater Serbia. Its crucial vision was
the idea that all ethnic Serbs need to live in the same state (MacDonald, 2002).
In BH Miloseviæ’s vision of Greater Serbia was literally carried out by Karadžiæ. It was
in 1990 that Karadžiæ, at the time working at Sarajevo city hospital as a psychiatrist, helped
to set up the nationalistic Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). SDS was formed in response to
the rise of Croatian nationalistic parties in BH, and dedicated to achieve the goal of Greater
Serbia – to ethnically cleanse different areas of the country of any non-Serbs. BH’s first
free, multi-party elections in November 1990 were won by three dominant nationalist parties
and they all immediately engaged in endless quarrels over what course the country should
follow. In 1991, when Bosnian parliament held a session on the referendum for Bosnian
independence, Karadžiæ famously declared:
If the Republic of Bosnia votes for independence the Serb paramilitaries will make the
Muslim people disappear, because the Muslims cannot defend themselves if there is war (in
Williams & Scharf, 2002: 43).
Less than two years later, Radovan Karadžiæ declared the creation of an independent
Serbian Republic of BH (later renamed Republika Srpska) with its capital in Pale, a suburb
of Sarajevo. He pronounced himself as the head of the state. Karadžiæ’s political party,
openly supported by Miloseviæ, mobilized and organized the Bosnian Serbs in fighting
against Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Croats in BH. The war in BH escalated in April
1992, when Bosnian Serbs started to besiege Sarajevo for 43 months, shelling Bosniak
forces, and also terrorizing the civilian population with a relentless bombardments and
sniper fire (MacDonald, 2002). Karadžiæ sought to eradicate any non-Serbs living in the
city. Bosnian Serb forces – assisted by paramilitaries from Serbia proper – committed war
crimes, including ethnic cleansing, establishing concentration camps, destroying property,
and massacring numerous sectors of the civilian population (97,207 civilian deaths)
(Population losses in Bosnia and Herzegovina 92-95, 2007). 
In his many public speeches Karadžiæ vigorously advocated the creation of a
homogeneous Greater Serbia “by violence”, while he often skilfully related to specific
historical events where Serbs had been positioned as “betrayed victims”. He used nostalgic
practices, such as a constant focus on Serbian “old-centuries” warrior identity, as crucial
mechanisms through which the very idea of “Serbianness” was reified. Karadžiæ was also
well known for publicly celebrating the crimes against the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats,
claiming these were committed in the name of Greater Serbia (MacDonald, 2002). For
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example, on 15 October 1995 in RS parliament, Karadžiæ publicly stated that he does not
regret the “radical mission” in Srebrenica and defined the massacre as the “defence against
the Turks” (Repe, 2008: 45).  5
On December 14 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement brought an end to the Bosnian war
and divided BH into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (with 51% of the
territory) in which mostly Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats live, and Republic Srpska
(with 49% of the territory) populated almost exclusively by the Bosnian Serbs. Ironically,
as many point out, the Agreement legalized Karadžiæ’s politics and his Serbian enclave,
Republic Srpska (Repe, 2008). Today, this political entity is almost ethnically pure, and
functions as a state within a state, having its own parallel political institutions (Verdery &
Burawoy, 1999). Karadžiæ succeeded where other Serbian politicians had failed (i.e.
Miloseviæ) – he has, de facto, enlarged the territory of Serbia while creating a Serbian state
in BH. In that way he has at least partially, realized the myth of Greater Serbia (Repe, 2008).
During the arrest of Karadžiæ, the political situation in Serbia was tense and deeply
divided. For example, on July 29 2008 the demonstrations against Karadžiæ’s arrest were
organized by all nationalistic oppositional political parties, including the Serb Radical Party.
The crowd of roughly 15.000 members screamed and chanted his name, while singing
“Karadžiæ is a hero of all heroes.” On Facebook, his advocates created various groups such
as "Free Radovan Karadžiæ”, and "Freedom for Radovan Karadžiæ” to mobilize support. At
the same time, death threats against the Serbian president Borislav Tadic were waged,
framing him as a Serbian traitor and Serb hater.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Some Notes on Collective Nostalgia 
Nostalgia has been often understood through medical metaphors. Stewart (1993)
characterizes nostalgia as a social disease, and Boym (2001) sees nostalgia as “the incurable
modern condition” (xiv). The world nostalgia envisions is different from what would be
created only from collection of memories. 
Nostalgia can be experienced in private as well as in public spaces. According to Davis
(1979: 122–123), private nostalgia is fuelled by particular, even intimate, personal memories
of an individual; collective nostalgia relies on collective/public images, symbols, and signs
available to many within the same historical and socio-cultural context. Collective nostalgia
is available to larger communities (e.g. ethnic groups, nations) and is often used in order to
forge a collective sense. As such, public nostalgia dwells in the content of the group’s
history, and exploits the group’s cultural symbols. In this sense it becomes possible that
different symbols help to trigger the nostalgic and nationalistic sentiment. For example, the
Chetniks’ (Serbian Serb nationalist guerrillas who fought against Nazi occupiers and Tito's
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partisans during the 2nd World War) iconography, frequently displayed during public
events, provoked nostalgia for Greater Serbia. 
Boym conceptualizes nostalgia into “reflective” versus “restorative” one. She defines
“reflective” one as a more critical one, since it calls the truth into doubt. In writing about
nostalgia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Boym argues that restorative nostalgia
“attempts a transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home,” while reflective nostalgia
“thrives in algia, the longing itself, and delays the homecoming – wistfully, ironically,
desperately” (xviii). Moreover, restorative nostalgia “does not think of itself as nostalgia,
but rather as truth and tradition,” while reflective nostalgia “ rests on the ambivalences of
human longing and belonging and does not shy away from the contradictions of modernity”
(xviii). On one hand, a reflective mode of nostalgia provides both a complicated emotional
state and a complex relation to history. Reflective nostalgia is based on cultural memory,
but it is concerned with individual and historical time. In this way, reflective nostalgia
allows for the endorsement of a specific identity narrative characterized by personal
memories of the collective history. On the other hand, restorative nostalgia occupies the
sphere of those concerned with reconstruction of the past in the sense of the restoration of
origins and tradition (Boym, 2001: XV). In their extreme forms, the advocates of restorative
nostalgia are engaged in the “anti-modern myth-making of history” (XV), usually to be
found on the right of the political continuum. Often, they are in favour of the re-
establishment of nostalgic practices that are held to be markers of their group identity
(Boym, 2001: 41). At the level of everyday life the results of this view are observable in the
pedantic restoration of monuments of the group’s “historical past”, changing the names of
streets and public spaces to reflect “our tradition”, rewriting of history in public discourse,
etc. all in order to construct and support one single narrative of national origin. Instances of
this type of nostalgia are easily found in the policies and acts of nationalistic parties all over
former Yugoslav states (Volcic, 2007). Or, specifically in the Serbian case, during the rallies
in support of Karadžiæ and against his extradition to The Hague, many carried Karadžiæ's
and other nationalistic-historical figure’s photos, sung songs about Greater Serbia and
demanded renaming of the streets in different Serbian cities after Karadžiæ and other Serbian
nationalistic-historical figures (Repe, 2008). In that way, the re-articulation of Greater
Serbia as a homeland of Serbs took place. The fantasy is to replace old symbolic names with
the names of Serbs associated with the vision of Greater Serbia. Such symbolism feeds the
nostalgic sense of longing for some golden times and hope for the return of the late 1980s
and early 1990s, when Serbia still had a strategic power and control over most parts of
former Yugoslavia. However, the important element of the nostalgic sentiment is that its
objects are not available in the present. The point is that nostalgia is only experienced in the
present, but only in relation to things from the past, which by the definition can never be
again.
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Serbian (Nationalistic) Journalism
The media, and especially television, were among the crucial tools of the war effort in
all former Yugoslav republics, and controlled by the nationalistic and populist forces,
inciting ethnic hatred and denigrating the democratic opposition. In Serbia, during the
1990s, there was a dominant professional ideology of a so-called “nationalistic journalism.”
There are a lot of elements characteristic of this journalistic discourse (De la Broose, 2003;
Milivojevic, 1996, 2007; Miloseviæ, 2008; Susa, 2005): “us-versus-them” dichotomy, “my-
nation-right-or-wrong” version of reporting, substantiation of the myths of superiority of the
Serbian nation in relation to the other nations of the former Yugoslavia, and forging a sense
of national pride and patriotism. 
Changes in media policy came after the fall of Miloseviæ’s regime in October 2000, and
ended the dominance of state television, but the policy changes still remain incomplete. The
changes regulating the television were carried out chaotically, without any clear policy or
legal frameworks. The new government recognized the importance of state television and
slowed down the changes. TS, according to Milivojevic (2007) does not play an explicit
propagandistic role any more, since it does not use militant exclusionary practices and
national hysteria. However, as many scholars note (e.g. Erjavec & Volcic, 2007;
Milivojevic, 2007; Susa, 2005), despite the fact that TS attempted to transform itself into
a public service institution, TS does work as a state television, since it is not independent
from governmental structures and it still predominately reproduces dominant political
discourse. Milivojevic (2007) asks a crucial question as to how TS should confront the
traumatic past of the nation, since TS itself helped to legitimate, normalize and
institutionalize a particular war culture that supported the expansionist and nationalist
politics of the Serbian regime. 
METHOD: PRINCIPLES OF RECONTEXTUALIZATION
AND REPRESENTATION OF SOCIAL ACTORS
Fairclough (2003) and Chouliaraki & Fairclough (1999) adopt Bernstein’s (1990)
definition of recontextualization as a representation of social events. In the process of
recontextualization, social events are not merely repeated. Rather, they are transformed in
their new setting, perhaps through the addition of new elements, or through the deletion of
others. In connection, Tannock (1995: 454) suggests that we can only ascertain whether
nostalgia is progressive or regressive if we examine what has been excluded from a
representation of the past. In his words, we need to “center essentially on what has been
edited out of the nostalgic text – on the conflicts of interest and differences of position that
are occluded, on the social groups and relations that are cut out of the picture, on the hidden
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values that may, intentionally or not, be in the process of being legitimated” (Tannock,
1995: 457).
The arrangement of events may change in the new context, or some elements may be
substituted for others. While recontextualization often involves the suppression and filtering
of some meaning potentials of a discourse (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999), it is also a
process which may expand meaning potential, through additions to, and elaborations upon,
the previous text. As Bernstein claims, particular social fields, and networks of social
practices, have been associated with “recontextualizing principles” (Bernstein, 1990). These
are specific “principles” according to which they incorporate and re-contextualize social
events. These principles underlie differences between the ways in which a particular type
of social event is represented in different fields, networks of social practices, and genres.
Fairclough (2003: 139–140) develops the following principles: Presence (e.g. which
elements of events, or events in a chain of events, are present/absent,
prominent/background?), Arrangement (e.g. how are events ordered?), Abstraction (e.g.
what degree of abstraction/generalization from concrete events?), and Additions (e.g. what
is added in representing particular events – explanation/legitimizations (reasons, purposes),
evaluation?). Critical discourse analysis also sees recontextualization in terms of a
dialectical colonization/appropriation. Recontextualization is a specific kind of a dialectic
that appropriates and colonizes discourses from different spaces and times (Chouliaraki &
Fairclough, 1999). The concept of appropriation accentuates the fact that, even in the
process of colonizing, a new discourse enters potentially transformative relationships with
existing discourses in the recontextualizing context. In this respect, our study attempts to
uncover how Serbian national television appropriated Karadžiæ’s arrest into a nationalistic
discourse, while helping to create a specific type of nostalgic nationalism.
In order to identify TS’s recontextualization, we also analyze how TS represented the
main social actors, i.e. who is included within the “us” realm and who is positioned as
“them”. As Hodge and Kress (1993) argue, one of the central discursive strategies in
ideological struggles relies on the construction of in-and-out group identities using
discursive means. We adopt Hall's “discourse of difference” (1989: 913) as the most
effective method to think through binary positions. 
DATA
We analyzed all 78 news items broadcast on all TS news programs from 21 of July (the
day of Karadžiæ’s arrest) up until 30 of July, 2008 (the day when Karadžiæ was sent to The
Hague). Why this particular time-frame? As argued, it was during this period that the
political situation in Serbia was intense, since the majority of opposition strongly challenged
the president, government, and institutions responsible for the arrest. Demonstrations in
support of Karadžiæ were organized every day. On the 30 July 2008, the situation started to
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calm down, since Karadžiæ was sent to The Hague. Why the focus on this particular
medium? We've analyzed TS’s news program precisely because it is still the most watched
program in Serbia, known for its pro-government orientation. Thus, the analysis of its
program can help to explain official government politics (Milivojevic, 2007; Tanasic, 2008).
TS broadcast two special news programs (on Tuesday, the 22 July 2008 between 20.15 and
24.00; and Wednesday, the 23 July 2008 between 20.15 and 22.00) focusing on the arrest
of Radovan Karadžiæ, called “Radovan Karadžiæ – Myth and Reality”, both having
extremely high ratings of 60% (roughly 2.5 million viewers) in Serbia. The rest of the news
programs (11.45-12.15, 17.00-17.25, 19.30-20.15) also enjoyed high ratings (Gledanost
RTS, 2008). Within a whole analyzed news program, in terms of genres, the news reports
dominated (56 items), followed by short interviews (9 items), news items (8 items) and
statements (5 items). We analyzed all news items as a whole, since they present primary
information to more than half of Serbian population (Tanasic, 2008; Gledanost RTS, 2008).
Thus, we try to reveal how the most popular television news program in Serbia represented
Karadžiæ’s arrest and incorporated, re-articulated and appropriated it within representation
of Serbian past and present. First, we follow a macro-structure analysis of
recontextualization’s principles to find out how TS represented Karadžiæ’s arrest.
Additionally, we employ a micro-analysis of the representation of the main social actors. 
TV SERBIA’S RECONTEXTUALIZATION OF KARADŽIÆ’S ARREST
(A) Presence and absence of elements of chains of events
Which chains of events were present, or absent, in television news dealing with
Karadžiæ arrest? The analysis has indicated that TS broadcast the following recurring
themes of the Karadžiæ’s arrest:
• The life of Radovan Karadžiæ as Dragan Dabiæ;
• Karadžiæ’s arrest as one of the crucial obligations and defining principles for Serbia on its
path towards the EU; 
• The details of Karadžiæ’s arrest, and the legal procedures of the arrest;
• Karadžiæ’s family;
• The legal procedures in the Hague Tribunal and the descriptions of Karadžiæ’s future life
in the prison; 
• Different reactions of politicians to Karadžiæ’s arrest; 
• Karadžiæ’s biography;
• Protests against the Karadžiæ arrest;
• Death threats against the Serbian president, ministers, and journalists favouring Karadžiæ’s
arrest. 
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Overall, the expressed nostalgia infused the ways in which other themes were
represented, and it served as a kind of a glue to connect the dominant topics. Specifically,
nostalgia here is put to use in a variety of ways. Firstly, the analysis has showed that the
most prominent theme has been Karadžiæ’s hidden life as a fugitive.  TS has focused on his6
life as Dragan Dabiæ, his new physical appearance, clothing, speech, psychological state of
mind, his alternative medicine interests, new love life, his shopping habits, his visiting of
a “Crazy house” café, his writing for the alternative medicine journal “Healthy life,” his
Web page, public lectures on energetic therapy, and his Croatian holidays. In a way,
Karadžiæ becomes a commercial-nationalist media product, a political commodity sold to
audiences.
The next most covered theme – also in quantitative terms – was devoted to a Serbian
foreign policy towards the West, the European Union (the EU) and the International
Community. Serbs have had a complex and traumatic relationship with the West. The
longevity of the wish to be European, Western, or, on the other hand, the desire to preserve
Serbian authenticity in opposition to the West has been noted by many scholars (Popov,
2000). For the advocates of civil society, the West signifies the source of the political and
economic reforms that Serbia should undergo. For others, it represents a neo-imperialist
threat to the Serbian state and culture. In this model, the West means either salvation or
imperial domination. But for all who use it, “the West” remains a statement of future
political intentions and a statement of national identity. Ironically, despite TS’s selective
coverage of the arrest, it has represented the event as a point of departure for Serbia in its
cooperation with the West – for which Serbia should be rewarded with some concrete
support and investments from the EU. TS’s coverage further focused on minor details of the
arrest: the legal procedures, the political consequences for Serbia, and the reactions of
Serbian elites and Karadžiæ’s family. TS emphasized the reactions of politicians to
Karadžiæ’s arrest, especially the representatives of the EU, the USA, NATO, the UN,
Republic Srbska, BH, Croatia, Monte Negro, Russia and the main Serbian political parties.
Different statements from Karadžiæ’s close collaborators and “ordinary people” alike were
recorded, expressing emotional desire and nostalgia for Greater Serbia. They similarly
celebrated the fact that during the BH war Karadžiæ partly realized Serbian dreams for
Greater Serbia.
Moreover, the news reports speculated about how the trial in The Hague will take place
in detail, and envisioned a life in a prison cell in Scheveningen for the once powerful and
popular nationalist leader. The anticipatory portrayals of Karadžiæ’s ignominious future is
at the same time a nostalgic one, insofar as nostalgia is often triggered by images of
grandeur in ruin (Boym, 2001). The pathos of the ruin, in other words, takes shape against
the background of the splendour of the shadow of past glory cast by the wreckage of the
present. In our case, Karadzic as once-great leader in decline. The everyday protests,
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organized to support Karadžiæ, have played a prominent role. The news programs also
covered the death threats against the Serbian president, and some pro-European ministers,
and journalists. Every day, TS repeated a short biography of Karadžiæ’s life.
However, in order to recontextualize the analysis, it's more important to explore which
chains of events were not represented (Fairclough, 2003). TS neglected to cover Karadžiæ’s
war crimes although they are widely acknowledged among local and foreign scholars (e.g.
Colovic, 2002; Popov, 2000; MacDonald, 2002; Repe, 2008). The elision of history as a war
criminal can be seen as a distinctly nostalgic practice, since restorative nostalgia clearly
represents an idealized version of the past. When describing the main reasons for Karadžiæ’s
arrest, TS did not cover the crime-against-humanity charges of the Hague Tribunal against
Karadžiæ. Instead, it focused only on the legal reasons for the arrest: “a significant step
towards Serbia's EU membership” (22 July 2008, TV News), “enormous pressures from the
Hague Tribunal and the EU” (24 July 2008, TV News) and “a Serbian ticket to finally enter
European Union” (26 July 2008, TV News). 
The analyzed news items completely ignored, for example, the complex theme of
Serbian responsibility for the delayed arrest of Karadžiæ. Many crucial questions were not
addressed, such as, who actually knew about Karadžiæ’s whereabouts, who was helping him,
and why the arrest came so late? Also, why does the current government refuse to offer
access to secret archives that could help to answer the above questions? 
Why has TS represented Karadžiæ’s arrest in such a thematically imbalanced way? TS
adopted the same (nostalgic) nationalistic principles for the construction of nationalistic
discourses as in the past, i.e. refusal of acknowledgement after the wars, a denial of
responsibility and a repression of memory (Broose, 2003; Milivojevic, 2007; Miloseviæ,
2008; Susa, 2005). Kammen’s description of nostalgia as “history without guilt” (1991: 6)
is particularly pertinent in this regard. It can be argued that TS neglected negative
information precisely because any reference to war crimes could question the myth of
Greater Serbia. Furthermore, any critical coverage of the past could remind the Serbs about
their negative role during the BH war. TS presented Karadžiæ’s arrest as a Serbian shift
towards the EU – and, in that, positioned a project of “joining the EU” as a positive process,
something that brings Serbia closer to the EU, and to its “modern roots.”
(B) Arrangement
How has TS “ordered” and “arranged” the main events of Karadžiæ’s arrest? As argued
above, the biography of Karadžiæc was reported in a linear way, following historical events,
but lacking any interpretation of the events. A typical segment from TS’s program is
illustrative here:
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1. Radovan Karadžiæ was born in 1945 in Petnjica village, near Nikšiæ. In 1960 he moved
to Sarajevo, where he met his wife, Ljiljana. He finished his BA in medicine, and became a
psychiatrist in a city hospital. He was intensively involved with politics from 1989... 
On 12 May 1992, he became a president of Republic Srpska. He was a president until
the 30 June 1996. The same year, in 1996, he left the political public life and gave the 
presidential power to vice-president of RS, Biljana Plavšiæ. In October 2004 he published
his book Miraculus of the Night. 
(22 July 2008, “Radovan Karadžiæ – Myth and Reality”).
Similarly, the events around Karadžiæ’s arrest followed chronological order, with no
additional explanations or interpretations: 
2. Radovan Karadžiæ was arrested on the 21 July in Belgrade. After the initial hearing, the 
investigative judge of Serbia's special court on war crimes Milan Dilpariæ decided that
Karadžiæ would be extradited to The Hague Tribunal. 
A day after the arrest, Serbia's minister for UN Tribunal relations, Rasim Ljajic and war
crimes prosecutor of the Belgrade County Court, Vladimir Vukèeviæ showed the journalists
a new photograph of Radovan Karadžiæ. He was living in New Belgrade under the false name
of Dr. Dragan Dabiæ, while practicing alternative medicine. 
On the 22 of July, the protests to support Radovan Karadžiæ were organized in Belgrade
by the Serbian Radical party, and other right-wing organizations. 
On the 23 of July, copies of different official materials from Serbian Army meetings were
found in the apartment where Radovan Karadžiæ was hiding.
On the 29 of July, dozens of supporters of Serbian Radical Party showed their solidarity
with Radovan Karadžiæ, while protesting against his arrest on the Belgrade’s Republic
Square. 
In the morning, the lawyer of the former president of the Republic of Srbska claimed that
he did not file an appeal against Karadžiæ's transfer to the international war crimes tribunal
in The Hague. He will attempt to prolong Karadžiæ's transfer. (30 July 2008, TV News).
First, then, the analysis shows that the coverage of the events of Karadžiæ’s life, arrest
and legal process followed a chronological order, representing these events as a sequence
of connected and linear events. This form of reconstruction gives the events a specific
meaning, since it differs from news-story conventions (presenting time-movement in terms
of causes and effects). It also avoids explicit interpretation of any events (Bird & Dardenne,
1997), because it doesn’t follow time in terms of cause and effect. Journalists use this
chronological narration as a strategic ritual in reporting, since it insulates them from
accusations of bias or distortion (Bird & Dardenne, 1997; Johnson-Cartee, 2005). The
journalists attempt to legitimize their “objectivity” through presentation of facts, reliable
sources, expert opinion, accuracy and fairness. However, while using strategic ritual in
reporting, objective treatment of fact and deference to official sources, journalists function
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as uncritical conduits for military and government opinion instead of fulfilling their
normative role as “watchdogs”.
The second most important effect of chronological narrative, besides naturalization, is
the dramatization of events, whereby journalists attempt to attract viewers and with that,
high ratings. Also for Serbian media, sensational tendencies proved commercially expedient,
and commercial imperatives of media organisations generate cultural content that reduce
social and cultural complexities. When TS reported crucial events from either Karadžiæ’s
political career and/or his arrest, TS has used the so-called “arrangement” principle in order
to construct a belief in objective reporting: it created a linear connection between the events
to offer only one interpretation of the events. In that, Karadžiæ has been (only) the president
of Republic Srpska (and not a war criminal), and now they have arrested him. While
employing this particular principle, TS contributes to the masking of the responsibility of
the Serbs for the crimes committed in BH. It continues to cultivate the myth of an innocent
Serbia, propagating the thesis that Serbs have always been victims of some external enemy,
conspiring to annihilate them. In that way, Karadžiæ is positioned as someone who acted
strongly to revenge past wrongs. TS attempts to erase the Serbian crimes in BH that were
committed in the name of Greater Serbia, with the political, military, economic support of
the majority of the Serbs (Colovic, 2002; MacDonald, 2002; Popov, 2000; Repe, 2008). 
(C) Abstraction/Personalization
What types of abstraction and generalization dominated the analyzed TS news
programs? The arrest of Karadžiæ was generalized in two ways. First, the already limited
coverage of Karadžiæ’s war crimes was portrayed in “a relative way”, framed in terms of
moral equivalence (see example 3) and described not as intentional acts but as “accidents.”
3. A journalist: What war crimes did Radovan Karadžiæ commit? What is he responsible for?
Vladislav Jovanovic: We have to know that it wasn’t only Karadžiæ who’s been involved.
Other presidents were participating, too, but they were not sent to The Hague. /.../ Accidents
happened on all sides… and these have much deeper causes. (July 23 2008, “Radovan
Karadžiæ – Myth and Reality”). 
In the above response, the source implicitly acknowledged that Karadžiæ is guilty of
crimes, but he has generalized them (“others were involved”) and relativized them (“in a
war, this kind of thing happens – everyone was doing it”). This practice remains a crucial
strategy for representing war crimes (for more, see Wodak, 2006). Moreover, the source
used the term "accident", which is a typical euphemism in Serbian nationalistic discourse
(Lukovic, 2002): it transposes criminal acts into the unintentional realm of chance, thereby
refusing to acknowledge that war crimes were also committed by Serbs. The use of the
notion “an accident” is illustrative – since an accident can happen without an intentional
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cause by some external “objective” force. Because the journalist did not challenge the
relativization of crimes or at least, demand an additional explanation, an implicit agreement
with the source of information was established. 
 TS claimed that Karadžiæ's arrest means a shift towards the EU path for Serbia – it
attempted to frame the significance of Karadžiæ arrest as fulfilling the EU's requirements
and thereby rendering Serbia deserving of being rewarded by the EU (see example 4). 
4. Goran Svilanovic, former Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs claimed that we the Serbs
have now proven to the world that we are finally on the path towards entry into the European
Union. He added that Serbia has to be rewarded by the EU. The EU has to cease its attempts
at blackmail. (July 23 2008,”Radovan Karadžiæ – Myth and Reality”). 
TS has used the “reverse” principle here. Personalization can be defined as a preference
for or focus upon the individual actor(s) and human interest angles in events, while
downplaying institutional and political considerations that establish their social context.
Many authors claim that increased media personalization results from the values embedded
in television (e.g. Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). In this regard,
the commercial and political values of entertainment take precedence over the public service
ideals of journalism. Especially because of its visual nature, television tends to focus on
personalities rather than on abstract entities such as parties and groups (Peri, 2004).
Furthermore, the effect of personalized news is to decontextualize news events and
especially to overlook structural power relations (Johnson-Cartee, 2005). The consequence
is also to naturalise war, through the breakdown of war into episodes, or series of events,
each reported and described largely in isolation. This logic serves to conceptualise war as
disconnected “events” rather than as an ongoing political and military process. The “human
story” becomes separated from the military-political policy of war, and the past. In a sense,
restorative nostalgia is implicitly used here as “truth and tradition” – TS restores its vision
of the golden past as a stable construct.
In the analyzed news stories, the focus on drama, visual spectacle, human-interest stories
and personalization means a focus on one person only – that is, a heavy emphasis on
Karadžiæ to the exclusion of other social actors and the social context that helped to frame
Karadžiæ's life. All of this results in the construction of a narrative suggesting that Karadžiæ
worked independently, without official Serbian state support. This meaning gets reinforced
by the use of the word “only” (see example 5). 
5. Only his nephew knew about Radovan Karadžiæ’s life as Dragan Dabiæ. Dragan Karadžiæ:
We usually talked in female voices, using female pronunciation, in order to deceive possible
eavesdroppers. (23 July 2008, TV news).
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TS’s coverage of Karadžiæ’s political life in the Republic Srpska during the 1990s also
focused strictly on Karadžiæ only – as if he had acted in isolation, disconnected from other
social actors and isolated from the historical and political situation. The aim here is to
represent Karadžiæ as a strong, skilled leader, a Serbian “warrior,” contributing to the idea
of Greater Serbia, while at the same time establishing a sense of distance from the crimes
for which he had been held responsible (see example 6).
6. Aleks Buha: … It was only Karadžiæ who knew exactly what was going on in BH at the
time. And he should be credited for helping to create a Serbian state in BH. (July 23 2008,
“Radovan Karadžiæ – Myth and Reality”). 
The employment of the abstraction/personalization principle served to relativize
Karadžiæ’s crimes, and to position Serbs in a positive light. Furthermore, it represented
Karadžiæ’s arrest as the ticket that will allow Serbia to enter the EU.
(D) Additions
What was added in the TS’s representation of the events about Karadžiæ’s arrest? And
were there different explanations/legitimizations and evaluations of the arrest? TS
journalists have, through their selection of interviewers, nostalgically evaluated the war in
BH as a victory, in which “the Serbs have finally achieved Serbian territory in Bosnia” or
as “partly fulfilled dreams of Greater Serbia.” For example:
7. Milan from Cacak claims: This was a big victory for the Serbs. Karadžiæ made our dreams
real! Honour to him! The only problem still ahead of us… is that the Serbs in Bosnia are
limited only to the territory of Republik Srpska. But at least we have that. I say this in a loud
and proud way! I am proud of this. People are scared to say this, but I am not... (24 July
2008, TV News).
But on the other hand, journalists evaluated Karadžiæ's arrest as a crucial obligation that
needs to be fulfilled, in order to receive rewards from the EU:
8. Zoran Pavlovic declared: European Union plays politics of negotiations. They have to
reward us for this arrest – for example, they have to formally cancel visas for Serbian
citizens, they have to accept Serbia into the EU candidature, and have to provide access to
the EU financial sources, such as different funds. Serbia needs to advance towards joining
the EU. (July 22 2008, “Radovan Karadžiæ – Myth and Reality”). 
This arrest should also “help to improve the image of Serbia within the International
Community” (24 July 2008, TV News). Thus, the representation of Karadžiæ’s arrest was
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used to brand Serbia on the international map – to convey a message that Serbia “is creating
a spiritual link with Europe and is coming to share the common European value system. It
is now a modern, civilized state, eager to join EU” (23 July 2008, TV News). 
The Representation of Social Actors
The ways in which main actors are represented serves chiefly as an affirmation of the
ideology. Our analysis of social actors shows that TS used the binary oppositions: “we”
versus “them.” Many scholars dealing with Serbian media propaganda show how, during
the 1990s, the discourse of difference was a crucial element in nationalistic media discourse
(e.g. De la Broose, 2003; Milivojevic, 1996). The “production of Serbian enemies” was
taking place during the end of the 1980s, whereby a whole spectrum of various enemies
within and outside the Serbian borders was produced, from the very specific to the
ethereally abstract, from the individual to the collective, from both the past and the present.
We counted all actors (n= 41) who were represented in the coverage as a “we” group.
Specifically, in Table I, we introduce those actors, who appeared at least 20 times in all 78
news items (since some actors were rarely mentioned). A common characteristic here is that
all the “we” social actors were positively represented, and were – except Karadžiæ –
“collectivized” (Van Leeuwen, 1996: 50). This was accomplished not only through the use
of the first person plural “we” (see example 9), but also through terms like “Serbia/Serbian
nation” (see example 10), and “our nation” (see example 12). The “we” group discourse
strategy attempts to assure that the positive image of Serbia/Serb prevails as homogeneous
and consensual.
 
9. We, the Serbs, have now proven that we respect the international law. Serbian enemies
cannot comprehend that the Serbs are successful in fulfilling the international requirements.
(23 July 2006, TV News).
10. We have successfully proven to the International Community that the Serbian nation now
meets all the criteria. The processes of modernization and Europeanization will follow. (22
July 2008, TV News).
11. Our strategy is to adopt a process of Europeanization and to preserve Serbian territorial
integrity, including Kosovo as a part of Serbia. Our nation will defend Kosovo and will never
allow Albanians to steal from us this Serbian cradle. (29 July 2006, TV News).
12. Velimir Ilic: Despite following the international orders and despite paying our dues, the
EU and the Hague Tribunal treat Serbia unfairly, and this will also happen in the case of
Karadžiæ. Do not have your hopes up. /…/ Tribunal is destroying Serbia. (30 July 2006, TV
News). 
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Similarly, the “them” group was coded in a particular way. As Table II shows the words
“Serbian enemies” were frequently used in order to construct an unspecified and anonymous
group of “them”. Van Leeuwen (1996: 51) defines this act as an “indetermination.” In this
case, it serves the purpose of inclusion of different social actors into a group of “Serbian
enemies” and, consequently, the construction of a positive “we” group. In these binary
oppositions, Serbia appears as a “stronger”, “better”, “more victorious”, “more successful”,
i.e. a superior nation. It’s clear here how nostalgia mobilizes unity, registers disappointment
with the present by framing “Others” and positing alternative worlds that can exclude. 
The “them” and the “Hague Tribunal” are constructed as the big “Other” and are both
positioned as the main threats to the Serbian identity. They are both framed as destroyers
of the Serbs. Additionally, the Kosovo Albanians continue to be the Serbian Other: they are
represented as thieves, waiting to “steal” “the cradle of Serbia” (see example 11). They
continue to be framed as eternal Serbian enemies (Popov, 2000) and the representation of
Kosovo as the “cradle of Serbia” continues to remain at the heart of the Serbian nationalistic
imaginary (Erjavec & Volcic, 2009; Popov, 2000).
The Hague Tribunal becomes a Serbian “new” Other (see example 12) not only because
of demands to arrest Karadžiæ and other military leaders, such as Mladiæ and Hadzic, but
also because Miloseviæ died there. 
The International community and the EU become relatively newly and differently
represented social actors. In the coverage, the international community means different
international organizations, such as UN, NATO, The Hague Tribunal and the European
Union. International community and the EU in particular are depicted as not understanding
the Serbs and as continuously blackmailing Serbia (for example, Karadžiæ is not enough –
now Mladiæ and Hadzic are wanted, too). For the EU, a metaphor “Fortress Europe” is used,
pointing to the restrictive laws, policies and practices resulting in the exclusion of non-
citizens. 
However, this representation is not exclusively negative, since Serbia wants to, at least
on the surface, fulfil these requirements and offer full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal
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(Torov, 2008). The construction of Serbia’s superior status in relation to the International
community and the EU is more implicit than it is in relation to the other actors, but is visible
in TS’s statements of expectation – Serbia deserves to be rewarded by the EU (see examples
13). 
13. The arrest of Karadžiæ means the fulfilment of all EU requirements; it means a ticket to
enter the EU. They demanded that from us… and we fulfilled the obligations, since they told
us we cannot even start a negotiation process. /.../ we gave them Karadžiæ, but now they want
Mladiæ! The pressure from the EU is even stronger now. /.../ However, Serbia needs to be
rewarded for Karadžiæ's arrest. (23 July 2008, “Radovan Karadžiæ – Myth and Reality”).
Interestingly, the former Serbian enemies, Bosniaks, formerly one of the crucial social
actors belonging to “them” group during the 1990s wars, were largely ignored during
Karadžiæ’s arrest (see, for example, Erjavec & Volcic, 2007; MacDonald, 2002; Popov,
2000). Despite the fact that TS cites three different politicians from BH about Karadžiæ's
arrest, Bosniaks are not represented in any other context – neither as enemies, nor as
victims. Perhaps this ignorance comes from the unwillingness to connect Karadžiæ and the
Serbs with crimes committed in Bosnia. 
Specifically, we also tried to find out how Karadžiæc is referred to in the news items.
Naming and labelling of a politician is not only a descriptive usage of linguistic resources,
but can be indicative of the social processes and practices embedded in the communicative
situation regarding, for instance, the social and political position of this leader within
society. The names used by the TS to refer to Karadžiæ are a case in point. For the analysis
we counted all the words (n= 181) referring to Karadžiæ. Because there was a diversity of
words, they are arranged into sub-sections, grouped in terms of semantic fields and
presented according to their numerical presence. 
 In TS’s coverage, the emphasis is on the semantic field of Karadžiæ’s life as Dragan
Dabiæ. The use of words, such as “alternative doctor”, “bioenergetic”, “poet”, “musician”,
“friendly neighbour”, and even “a lover” (see example 14), shows that TS attempted to
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explicitly position Karadžiæ as a nice, warm, friendly, emotional, loving, and intelligent
man, who possesses some spiritual powers and cannot really be “a war criminal.” 
14. Karadžiæc has been extremely intelligent and creative human. People perceived him as
a bio-energetic, a therapist, a friendly neighbour, a poet and a musician. /.../ the editor of the
newspaper Healthy Life, for which Karadžiæ contributed essays, claimed that he was
bohemian. /.../ His colleagues say that he had a lover, a brunette called Mila. (23 July 2008,
“Radovan Karadžiæ – Myth and Reality”). 
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On the other side, there are only three names referring negatively to Karadžiæ (“war
criminal”, “murderer”, and “European Osama bin Laden”), published five times altogether.
Because of journalistic attempts to present the coverage as “objective”, the news stories also
had to include negative opinions from Western media and politicians (see example 15). 
15. Richard Holbrooke declared: This is a historical day. A European Bin laden has finally
been arrested. (22 July 2008, TV News). 
TS covered predominately positive evaluations of Karadžiæ (for example, “the greatest
Serbian hero”), as stated by Serbian nationalistic politicians:
16. Secretary General of Serbian Radical Party Aleksandar Vucic claimed: The Government
arrested the greatest Serbian hero. (22 July 2008, TV News). 
TS also positioned Karadžiæ within family relations, in order to portray him as a good
husband, father, brother and uncle (see example 17). 
17. Radovan was an exceptional uncle – says his nephew Dragan. (28 July 2008, TV News).
The analysis also reveals that TS covered Karadžiæ as a great politician. A statement
from an “ordinary man” connotes that Karadžiæ is a good politician because he has gained
territory for the Serbs. In the following report, similar implicit nostalgia for Greater Serbia
can be detected: 
18. Radovan Karadžiæ was an extremely capable politician, who really conquered more
territory that historically belonged to the Serbs. Not like some other Serbian politicians. (22
July 2008, TV News).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this article, we attempted to explore how Karadžiæ's arrest was represented in TS's
news programs. Particular nostalgic sentiments were used, co-opted and appropriated by TS,
in order to achieve political goal of channelling specific interpretations about the past and
present. In that sense Svetlana Boym’s insight that nostalgia is the “romance with one’s own
fantasy” (2001:xiii) is a very accurate description of the relationship between the nostalgic
sentiment as employed by TS. We argue that TS used restorative nostalgia in ways that
served both commercial and state interests, consolidating its place in an emerging synergy
between government and market that we described, drawing on Zizek, as forming a military-
poetic-media-entertainment complex. In TS's discourse, nostalgia for Greater Serbia was
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present amidst the evidence of crimes committed in its name. Moreover, Karadžiæ was
portrayed as a leader who has at least partly realized Serbia’s expansionist goals and made
it possible for Serbs in BH to live together.
TS reproduced a specific type of nationalistic discourse – one which uses strategies of
suppression of sensitive themes, including coverage of or reference to war crimes. Overall,
TS glossed over contradictory elements that could compromise the ideal vision of Great
Serbia. Nostalgic nationalism, as expressed in TS coverage of Karadžiæ’s arrest requires
some kind of a disappointment in order to re-create the idealized nostalgic construction of
the past community it hopes to achieve in the future. This type of nostalgia functions as the
search for continuity (Tannock, 1995). The renewed possibility of the future depends upon
a strong narrative of return. TS’s narrative articulates unity in terms of loss, by invoking
nostalgia for a romanticized notion of Serbian unity in the past – a wholeness of community
experience that has been eradicated by unjust external forces. Karadžiæ was predominately
represented in a positive light: on the one hand, as a hero and a strong politician, and on the
other, as a bio-energetic, a poet and a family man with a new identity. Any connections
between Karadžiæ, the Serbs, and especially the current government with war crimes in BH
were brushed aside. Thus, TS incorporated Karadžiæ’s arrest into the predominant
nationalistic discourse. It recontextualized pre-existing discourses to reproduce nationalism
for a new, “pro-European” politics. TS covered the “historical arrest” of Radovan Karadžiæ
without serious attempt to confront the traumatic past and reconcile with it. In that, nostalgia
employed by TS exploited popular culture with its entailed “banalities” of everyday life.
NOTES
1. Serbian epics has always been a symbol of a national imagination. Nationalist discourse wants to establish
that a nation has always existed and in doing so often articulates and reinterpretes already existing discourses and
other available cultural material, to convey a particular sense of belonging.
2. Greater Serbia generally and in this paper specifically refers to the specific idea within Serbian
nationalism – whose goal it is to unite all Serbs and Serbian lands in one state.
Greater Serbia generally and in this paper specifically refers to the specific idea within Serbian nationalism
– whose goal it is to unite all Serbs and Serbian lands in one state.
3. Serbian nationalists name the Muslims in former Yugoslavia »the Turks« (Erjavec & Volcic, 2007). In
this example, Bosniaks are called »the Turks«. 
4. Karadžiæ faces eleven charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. He is charged with
responsibility for the Serbian slaughter of almost 8.000 Muslims at Srebrenica in July 1995, the long siege of
Sarajevo, and the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of north-western Bosnia in the autumn of 1992, when tens of thousands of
non-Serbs were killed and hundreds of thousands driven from their homes.
5. Perhaps Karadžiæ’s most infamous crime during the wars was the Srebrenica massacre committed in front
of the Dutch United Nations troops. Approximately 8,000 people, mostly men, were slaughtered despite the “safe
area” designation. 
6. Also in quantity terms, the largest number of news programs (more than half) has been devoted to the
secret life of Radovan Karadžiæ as Dragan Dabic.
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